Being and Appearance in Antiquity

(Sein und Schein in der Antike – L’Être et l’Apparence dans l’Antiquité)

Eighth International Conference of the German Foundation for Ancient Philosophy (GANPH)

1–4 September 2025, University of Fribourg (Switzerland)

Following previous congresses in Berlin (2004), Hamburg (2007), Würzburg (2010), Munich (2013), Zürich (2016), Frankfurt/M. (2019) and Marburg (2022), the eighth major congress of the German Society of Ancient Philosophy will take place in Fribourg from 1–4 September 2025 and it is dedicated to the theme of ‘Being and Appearance in Antiquity’.

• Call for abstracts / call for papers [de/en] (deadline: 2024-09-01)

The international congress aims to bring together experts, young scholars and students of ancient philosophy and related disciplines from Europe and overseas in Switzerland for a multi-day professional exchange. The theme of being and appearance offers a broad basis for a range of philosophical and literary topics – from metaphysics and epistemology, to the philosophy of language, logic and argumentation, to imitation in art and poetics – and for establishing links to current debates such as those on ‘alternative truths’ and artificial intelligence.

The contrast between being and appearance is one of the central tensions in ancient thought. It is closely related to other – no less important – pairs of opposites, including knowledge and opinion, real object and appearance, truth and falsehood, sincerity and deception, reality and unreality (or non-being), original and imitation, and paradigm and image. The first known formulation of the contrast between being and appearance can be found in the philosophy of the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides, which is characterized by the contrast between being (ἐόν) and appearance (δοκοῦντα) and which also strongly influenced the atomists, Plato and Aristotle. The being–appearance dichotomy preoccupied ancient Western philosophy in various respects from its beginnings until late antiquity and has echoes in literature and in other arts.

The congress will shed light on many of the facets of the being–appearance dichotomy and will explore the broad range of possible interpretations of the two notions and the complex relation between them. Metaphysics and epistemology may provide a central starting point: many questions on the subject of being and appearance are based on the fundamental assumption that there are different forms or degrees of existence and, correspondingly, different cognitive capacities. One of the congress’s aims is to examine the assumptions, reasons and arguments for different views of reality, to enquire into the different avenues of cognitive access to reality and imitations, and to reflect on the impact that the dichotomy between reality and the realm of appearances has had on logic, conceptions of truth, and theories of argumentation. A further focus will be illustrations and reflections of this opposition as it has played out in art, literature and aesthetics.

The complexity of the topic of ‘being and appearance’ is based not least on the fact that the two concepts can be expressed using different terms in Greek and Latin. While the Greek verb einai and the Latin esse and their derivatives correspond to the concept of being, appearance has various possible equivalents in Greek and Latin: these are primarily the verb dokein (to seem), whose derivatives include doxa (opinion or belief; Lat.: opinio), and the verb phainomai (to appear, to be visible, to show oneself; Lat.: apparere), with associated terms such as phantasia (imagination, representation, mental image; Lat.: phantasia, imagination) and phainomenon (appearance).

In addition, the various terms for the concept of appearance or seeming can be used in at least two fundamentally different ways. On the one hand, that something appears can mean that it shows itself, that is, that it becomes manifest or evident. In this case, the appearance represents correctly – in the sense of truthfully – that from which it derives, although there is a formal difference between the appearance and that which appears, the original. On the other hand, what appears can also be a ‘mere’ appearance. In this case, the appearance does not reproduce something as it is but creates a false, deceptive impression.

In order to give structure to the complex topic of being and appearance, the lectures will be divided into eight sessions. These sessions will be oriented towards systematic areas of philosophy but will also be open to non-philosophical contributions from neighbouring disciplines such as classics, ancient history and the history of art/aesthetics. In addition, interdisciplinary approaches and references to contemporary philosophy are very welcome.

Confirmed speakers (in alphabetic order)

Francesco Ademollo (Università degli Studi di Firenze), Mathilde Brémond (Université Clermont Auvergne), Luca Castagnoli (Oxford University), Lorenzo Corti (Université de Lorraine), Jonas Grethlein (Universität Heidelberg), Martin Hose (Universität Bern), Katerina Ierodiakonou (Université de Genève), Mitzi Lee (University of Colorado at Boulder), Fiona Leigh (UCL London), Benjamin Morison (Princeton University), Marilù Papandreou (University of Bergen), Caterina Pellò (Université de Genève), Máté Veres (Université de Genève), Laura Viidebaum (New York University), Katja Maria Vogt (Columbia)

Sessions

The lectures will be divided into sessions according to the following eight themes:

1. Metaphysics and the question of being
2. Epistemology and the possibility of knowledge
3. Philosophy of language and the possibility of linguistic reference to the world
4. Truth and theories of truth
5. Aesthetics and the poetics of being and appearance
6. Logic, the theory of argumentation and the art of deception and imitation
7. Ethics and the real and the apparent good
8. Political philosophy and rhetoric

1. Metaphysics and the question of being

In this session, researchers will explore the status of being, i.e. the question of what is and what is not but only appears to be. The status and structure of reality and the possibility of degrees of existence (‘ontological comparative’) will also be examined. The being of certain types of objects (qualities, mathematical objects, the void, the lecta, space and time, first principles of being, etc.) is a further potential area of discussion, both in relation to particular positions and from a comparative perspective. Researchers are also welcome to address these questions in relation to contemporary debates in analytic metaphysics and ontology.

2. Epistemology and the possibility of knowledge

In this session, discussions will focus on questions such as: What cognitive capacities were attributed to humans (and to other living beings) in antiquity as necessary for adequately grasping reality? How do our various cognitive faculties relate to each other, according to ancient views? How do we gain knowledge of the world? What role does perception play? Is there a criterion of truth? How can deception be explained?

3. Philosophy of language and the possibility of linguistic reference to the world

This session focuses on the philosophy of language, a discipline that often leads a marginal existence in ancient philosophy. It considers questions such as: What are the possibilities and limits of referring to reality through language? What is the basis of successful reference? Is linguistic reference subordinate to other forms of reference (e.g. reference through thinking)? How is expressing or linguistically referring to non-existent things possible? Further possible topics include non-philosophical reflection on and uses of language. Connections to current questions and theories in the philosophy of language are also welcome.

4. Truth and theories of truth

This session delves into questions such as: What are truth and falsehood? What kinds of things are true or false? How many different conceptions of truth are there? Is truth objective? Is there a criterion of truth? Are there degrees of truth and falsity? Do truth and falsity even exist? How were practical truth and practical falsity conceived of in antiquity?

5. Aesthetics and the poetics of being and appearance

This session is dedicated to questions such as the following: How should the educational potential of imitation be assessed? What risks does imitation harbour? Can the tension between Plato’s criticism of poetry and his choice of the dialogue as a literary form be resolved? Does Plato have a consistent understanding of literature? This session also offers space for questions related to the history of reception and impact, for example in the form of comparative analyses (e.g. of the concept of mimêsis in Aristotle and Horace or Cicero). Contributions from philology, ancient history of art, aesthetics and the philosophy of art are also particularly welcome in this session.

6. Logic, the theory of argumentation and the art of deception and imitation

This session offers space to consider how Greek thinkers responded to the task of establishing standards for the correctness of logical conclusions and arguments. How did the Sophists, Plato and Aristotle, as well as the Megarians and the dialecticians, the Stoics and Sextus Empiricus, deal with the identification, diagnosis and classification of invalid, inconclusive or otherwise questionable syllogisms and arguments? This session also offers space to examine notorious puzzles such as the sorites paradox and the liar paradox, both of which testify to the continued relevance of debates in ancient logic.

7. Ethics and the real and the apparent good

This session will explore questions such as the following: How was practical truth conceived of in antiquity? Did the ancients believe in objective values (‘the true or actual good’)? How is deception concerning the true good possible? Is Socratic intellectualism tenable? Is acratic behaviour possible, and if so, how can it be explained? What are pleasure and displeasure? Are pleasures compatible with the good life? How can we distinguish between true and false desires? Is it possible to ‘purify’ oneself of false desires? Are some pleasures constitutive of the good life? What is the connection between desire and belief?

8. Political philosophy and rhetoric

This session will be dedicated to questions such as the following: Does Plato’s conception of an ideal city, as developed in the Republic, contain insights on how to react to political challenges such as demagogy, instability and the pleonexia of the ruling class? What role does education play in meeting or preventing these challenges? What influence does the laws have? This session also offers space to discuss questions belonging to the philosophy of law, in particular the connections between nature (physis) and law (nomos). Does Protagorean relativism justify legal positivism? Does Plato defend a naturalistic account by relying on the rational capacities of humans and the idea of an objective highest good, or can we identify allusions to legal positivism in his Laws? This session also focuses on questions about the role of rhetoric in antiquity and the functions and aims that various thinkers attributed to this technê.